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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ALAN G. ROSS, a single man; LARRY R. 
BROWN, a married man as to his sole and 
separate property; MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
and NANCY B. MURPHY, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
v. 
TOMMY A. DORSEY and ERIN T. DORSEY, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants/Appellant, 
and 
The ESTATES OF F.M. HARKER and GLADYS 
L. HARKER; BANK OF THE CASCADES, dba 
FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANK, an Oregon 
corporation doing business in the State 
of Idaho; BANNER BANK, a Washington 
corporation doing business in the State 
of Idaho; and any and all other 
claimants in and to that common beach 
area being approximately 20 feet wide 
and 132.87 feet long and consisting of 
all that property lying between the 
shore of Priest Lake and the West 
boundary of Lot 1 Steamboat Bay Lots 
according to the Plat thereof as 
recorded on February 21, 1966, in the 
records of Bonner County, Idaho, Book 2 
of Plats, Page 125, located in 
Government Lot 5 Section 27, Township 
60 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, 
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DOCKET NO. 39152-2011 
Bonner County Case No. 
2009-904 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner 
* * * * 
THE HONORABLE STEVE VERBY, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
* * * * 
GARY A. FINNEY 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(Attorney for Dorsey -
Defendant - Appellant) 
Edward J. Anson 
Witherspoon Kelley 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300 
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Brent C. Featherston 
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113 S. Second Ave. 
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(Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Respondents) 
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REPLY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
COMES NOW, the Appellant, DORSEY, and files this REPLY 
as additional argument in rebuttal to the Respondents' 
Brief, as follows: 
I . THE FACTS. 
ROSS, et al., I. Statement of the Case, page 1, first 
paragraph, claim that DORSEY has not set forth a recitation 
of facts, so they choose to restate the undisputed facts of 
the case, as allowed by I.A.R. 35(b) (3). 
First, I.A.R. 35(b) (3) does not allow ROSS, et al., to 
"restate the undisputed facts of the case", as that rule 
actually provides for a statement of the case to the extent 
Respondent disagrees with the statement of the case set 
forth in Appellant's Brief. Obviously, ROSS, et al., agree 
with DORSEY'S statement of the case as to the facts, because 
they merely restated and repeated the exact same facts 
already set forth by DORSEY. ROSS, et al. in A PROCEDURAL 
STATEMENT OF TITLE CASE, which is not procedure at all, 
repeat facts that are: 
1. The Plat of Steamboat Bay contains the 
statement of the Owner's (Harker) intent. This was already 
quoted by DORSEY, Appellant's Brief, page 8, second 
paragraph, as the exact language of the Plat Owner's 
Certification. 
2. The language of the Harker to Wright Deed 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) with the reservation in grantors, 
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Harker. This Warranty Deed signed by Harker on 21 Feb 1966, 
held in escrow on a contract for deed, and not recorded 
until 12 years later in May 1978, was already quoted by 
DORSEY. (Appellant's Brief, pages 6 and 7). 
Without any basis in the record, in fact or law, Ross, 
et al., page 4, first paragraph, falsely state: 
The District Judge found that Harkers reserved fee 
title to themselves in the common beach and by the Deed 
language privately dedicated an easement on the common beach 
and road in favor of all eight (8) lots of Steamboat Bay 
Lots (Tr. pp 317-328) (underlining emphasis added). ROSS, 
et al., may have their own opinions, but not their own 
facts. In fact and law, District Judge Verby found and 
concluded just the opposite of the foregoing underlined 
quotation from Respondents' Brief. First of all - the 
citation to Tr. pp. 317-328 is to 11 pages, none of which is 
as ROSS, et al., claim. The actual finding and legal 
conclusion of District Judge Verby is to the exact opposite, 
starting at Tr. p. 320, 11. 24-25, that, 
"Mr. Finney has argued and is correct in his 
analysis as it relates to the reservation " 
Continued to Tr. p. 321, 11. 1-6 
" ... By [Harker] reserving in the Deed to Wrights 
this private beach, that doesn't convey to 
anyone a fee simple interest. By doing so, 
that doesn't by operation of law, convey 
anything to the future lot owners. That being 
the lot owners of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8." 
District Judge Verby then cited Davis v. Gowen, 83 
Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403, for the proposition that in a 
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conveyance, if any reservation is made in the property 
conveyed, the part reserved remains in the grantors therein 
and it does not inhere (sic-inure) to the benefit of a 
stranger to the instrument. (Tr. p. 321, 11. 16-22). 
District Judge Verby clearly told ROSS, et al., 
"***From Harkers to the Wrights, you as 
plaintiffs did not receive anything by that 
reservation. And when I say, "by anything", I 
mean you received nothing ... " (Tr. p. 322, 11. 
11-14) 
In summary, Respondents' Brief, page 4, first 
paragraph, is accurate that the District Judge found that 
Harkers reserved fee title to themselves in a common beach, 
but is patently in error in stating, "and by the Deed 
language dedicated an easement on the common beach ... " 
ROSS, et al., did not file a Cross-Appeal- they can not 
now argue that District Judge Verby was in error that the 
reservation gave them nothing, so they just ignore his 
actual ruling and claim to the contrary of the District 
Judge's findings and conclusions. 
Again, Respondents' Brief, page 5, last paragraph and 
continued on page 6, states directly contrary to the 
District Judge's findings and conclusion, that ... "the 
subsequent Harker - Wright Deed executed February 21, 1966 
led the Trial Court to the conclusion that reserving 
ownership dedicated the common beach in the Harker-Wright 
Deed. Respondents' authority is Tr. pp. 319, 11. 12-17". 
DORSEY points out - there is no language as stated by ROSS, 
et al. that the Harker-Wright Deed dedicated the common 
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beach, nor is there any such finding in the District Judge's 
ruling at Tr. p. 319, 11. 12-17, which actually only states 
that it is a mixed question of finding of fact and 
conclusions of law that it was the intent of Harker to 
provide for roadway and beach access to all lot owners of 
the subdivision by including the language in the owner's 
certification, i.e. the Owner's Certification created the 
dedication of an easement. 
II. DORSEY'S ANALYSIS OF ROSS, ET AL.'S III. 
ARGUMENT. 
Much of the ARGUMENT of ROSS, et al., does not dispute 
what DORSEY set forth in their Appellant's Brief. 
ROSS, et al., filed this action, entitled COMPLAINT FOR 
QUIET TITLE, and they must rely or prevail on the strength 
of their own title, which they alleged to be as common 
owners (tenants in common) to a lakefront parcel of land. 
ROSS, et al., never pled an "easement" on this parcel, not 
in a written document, not in testimony, and not in their 
counsel's closing argument to the District Court. The word 
"easement" appeared for the first time in the District Court 
findings/conclusions at Tr. p. 324, 11. 20-22, i.e., stating 
that when a common law dedication is accomplished, it has 
the legal effect of creating an easement in favor of lot 
purchasers. The District Judge cited head-note principals 
of the common law of private dedication from Sun Valley Land 
and M2neral, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 Idaho 543, 66 P.3d 798 
(2003) . (Tr. p. 324, 11. 13-14). However, the Sun Valley 
Land and M2nerals case supra, found no easement rights to 
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use common areas and no common law private dedication, and 
this case is authority to deny any common law dedication by 
Harker's Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots. In the Owner's 
Certification Harker stated their intention to plat Lot 1 as 
extending to the waters of Priest Lake. ROSS, et al., 
acknowledge the exact words of the Plat at the top of 
Respondents' Brief, page 10, third paragraph, and that 
DORSEY contends that the language of the Plat, Owner's 
Certification caused Lot 1 to encompass all of the beach 
front extending to the mean high water line of Priest Lake. 
ROSS, et al., seem to think they can get around the Plat 
itself and prevail because of their stated "inconvenient 
fact" supposedly overlooked in DORSEY'S argument as to the 
reservation in the Harker-Wright Deed. (Respondents' Brief, 
page 10, fourth paragraph). The inconvenient fact to ROSS, 
et al., is that the Harker-Wright Deed reservation in 
Harker, did not give ROSS, et al. anything and it gave them 
nothing, according to District Judge Verby's ruling - from 
which they filed no cross-appeal. It needs to be 
remembered, ROSS, et al.'s own expert witness, Surveyor Mr. 
Bailey said, 
"A. In my professional opinion in conjunction 
with the ownership certificate on the original 
plat, the line would extend through that 
northerly point on line monument to the 
original high water, wherever that may be", and 
when asked if it would be the same on the south 
line of Lot 1, answered, "It would be". (Tr. 
p. 61, 11. 15-22)" 
In Sun Va~~ey Land and M2nera~, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 
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Idaho 543, 66 P.3d 798 (2003), the Lot Owners sued, in a 
quiet title action, for property rights based on a 
subdivision plat, and its covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions (CC&R's). The Plat itself depicted 45 circular 
1/4 acre lots, and open space. The CC&R's indicated this 
open space shown on the Plat would be designated as "Common 
Area" and that this Common Area would be owned by a 
homeowner's association for the common use and enjoyment of 
the individual lot owners. The Supreme Court held that this 
did not create easement rights because common law private 
dedication was not clearly and unequivocally intended. 
III. IN QUIET TITLE, PLAINTIFFS HAVE THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO PROVE THEIR TITLE, AND MAY NOT RELY ON 
THE WEAKNESS OF DEFENDANT'S TITLE. 
ROSS, et al., have no conveyance of title or ownership, 
ever at all, for the real estate to which they sought quiet 
title. The standard of proof is: 
"***Under Idaho case law the rule is that 
the party seeking to quiet title against 
another must succeed on the strength of 
their own title, and not on the weakness 
of that of his adversary." 
Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Cooper Mining Co., Inc. 
100 Idaho 325 at 331 (1979) 
(Re-affirmed in Rend v. Harvey 
147 Idaho 364 (2009) 
In the first instance, the glaring deficiency is the 
absence of any title whatsoever in ROSS, et al. The entire 
chain of title and the deed conveyances are trial exhibits 
(Defendants' Exhibits L, CC, DD). After Harker had conveyed 
Lots 1 and 2 to Wright, Harker conveyed the remaining 
platted Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to Battaglia and Moore. 
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There were intervening owners, but ultimately these Lots 3-8 
were conveyed to Ross, et al. None of the conveyances from 
Harker, or any subsequent owner, ever conveyed any interest 
in the disputed real estate for which ROSS, et al. f sought 
quiet title. The only conveyance of the real estate at 
issue was the Warranty Deed, Wright to DORSEY (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2) which conveyed Lots 1 and 2 in Steamboat Bay 
Lots, according to the Plat thereof (emphasis added). The 
Plat, Owner's Certification, clearly and unambiguously 
stated the Owner's intention that Lot 1, as located on the 
plat, shall include the lands lying between the sidelines 
produced to the mean-high water line of Priest Lake. 
According to the Plat (Defendant's Exhibit B) Lot 1 
included the real estate at issue, and it was deeded 
(conveyed) to DORSEY by Wright. The Plat clearly and 
un~~iguously, plats Lot 1 as including the land all the way 
to the water line of Priest Lake. 
ROSS, et al., for the first time, which was never pled, 
raised, or argued below, adds a footnote 2, page 14, 
Respondents' Brief, stating that it is worth noting than 
even the Owner's Certificate (sic) contains an ambiguity in 
that it refers to sidelines "produced to the mean high water 
line". Harker chose not to use the language "extended" to 
the water line. This claim of ambiguity in the word 
"produced" can not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Without ever proving their title, except for the effect 
of the Plat itself, which neither conveyed, nor dedicated, 
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anything to ROSS, et al., or their predecessors, the 
Respondents' Brief makes some bold statements attacking 
DORSEY'S title. Respondent's Brief, page 9, in the third 
paragraph starting on that page, refers to DORSEY'S counsel 
arguing that the reservation (emphasis added) language found 
in the Warranty Deed (Wright to Dorsey) "subject to" 
language is only a limitation on Wright's warranty of title 
to DORSEY. Actually, the Respondents' Brief is in error to 
call this "subject to" language the reservation language, as 
the reservation language was only in the Harker to Wright 
deed. There is no reservation language found in the Warranty 
Deed to DORSEY (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). Respondents' Brief 
then states that ... "At no point does DORSEY'S counsel 
explain this point or provide case law to support it." 
Respondents' Brief overlooks pages 20-22 of Appellant's 
Brief, case law Caps tar Radio qperating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 
Idaho 704, 152 P.2d 581 (2007) that "subject to" language 
merely excludes warranties of title, and "subject to" 
language does not withhold title from DORSEY. 
IV. B. RESPONDENTS' RESTATED ISSUES ON APPEAL, -
PARAGRAPH 3, PAGE 18, DORSEY SUBMITS THAT THE 
RESERVED FEE OWNERSHIP WAS NOT FOUND TO HAVE 
CREATED AN EASEMENT FOR ALL EIGHT (8) LOTS. 
Respondents' Brief, page 18, page 3, is one of their 
Restated Issues, as follows: 
"3. Did the Trial Court err in finding 
that Harker reserved fee ownership in the 
common beach area and thereby creating an 
easement for the benefit of all eight (8) 
lots?" 
First, the Trial Court made no such finding. Contrary 
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to Respondents' Brief is a misrepresentation of the Trial 
Court's finding - because the finding was exactly contrary 
to Respondents' claim that the Harker to Wright reservation 
created an easement. As has already been pointed out by 
DORSEY, the Trial Court found and concluded that, 
a) Plaintiffs did not receive anything by the 
Harker to Wright reservation (Tr. p. 322, 11. 11-13). 
b) More specifically - Plaintiffs received 
nothing. (Tr. p. 332, 11. 13-14) 
V. RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT PONDEROSA HOMESITE LOT 
OWNERS V. GARFIELD BAY RESORT, INC., 143 IDAHO 
407, 146 P.3D 673 (2006) AND SADDLEHORN RANCH 
LANDOWNERS, INC. V. DEYER, 146 IDAHO 747, 203 P.3D 
377 (2008) ARE "VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL" TO THIS 
ACTION IS DISPUTED BY DORSEY. 
ROSS, et al., Respondents' Brief, page 16, submit that 
Ponderosa HomeSite Lot Owners v. Garrield Bay Resort, Inc., 
146 P.3d 673 (2006) is virtually identical to the facts of 
this instant case. In Ponderosa Homesite, supra, the actual 
facts were stated that the Plat itself shows an area marked 
as "lake access", being an "L" shaped small piece of 
lakeshore property, located between lots 3 and 4 within the 
Plat of Ponderosa Homesite subdivision, which connected with 
the public road and the larger portion abutting on Garfield 
Bay on Lake Pend Oreille south of Lot 4. The "lake access" 
was identified on the Plat, without block or lot 
designation, and without mention in the dedication. The 
plat dedication included: 
"(t)hey do hereby dedicate to the public, for the use 
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of the public, for the use of the public as highways, the 
roads shown upon this plat". Neither the plat, nor any 
contemporaneous deeds, declaration, nor papers indicate who 
is to be the owner of the "lake access". (This was recited 
as coming from the first appeal, Ponderosa Home Site Lot 
Owners v. Gar£ie~d Bay Resort, Inc., 138 Idaho 543, 66 P.3d 
798 (2003). The District Court had found the apparent 
intent of placing the area marked "lake access" on the Plat 
must have been as an inducement to lot buyers. The Supreme 
Court held that similarly to Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho 
529, 585 P.2d 608 (1978) the legal effect of illustrating a 
private road on a plat and dedicating it is the creation of 
an easement for lot purchasers. The Monaco v. Bennion case, 
99 Idaho 529, referenced to Smylie v. Pearsa~l, 93 Idaho 
188, 457 P.2d 427 (1969), concerned a parcel, not given a 
designated lot number, which was located on the lake at the 
terminus of a "drive-way" connected to a "road", and which 
formed a natural boat launch and landing area at the 
terminus of the driveway. The trial court found the parcel 
was no part of the platted lots, and was dedicated to the 
public (emphasis added). This amounted to a common law 
dedication of public areas indicated ~ the plat (emphasis 
added) (Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho 529, 533). 
The legal effect was that the original owner and 
platter, still owned the private roadway, but by dedicating 
it had created an easement in favor of lot purchasers. 
The Smylie case, supra, and the Monaco case, supra, are 
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significant distinguishable for the instant action in that, 
1. The Plats delineated the disputed area as 
"driveway", "road", and was referred to by Bennion's counsel 
as a road easement that appears on the Plat. 
2. The disputed area was no part of the platted lots. 
(Monaco at 533) . 
The instant action is to the contrary, 
1. the disputed area is not platted as "driveway", 
"road", "common area", or "common beach", and 
2. The Owner's Certification on the Plat itself by 
Harker declares the disputed area to be part ·of a platted 
lot, i.e. Lot 1. 
Respondents' Brief, second paragraph, page 16, defines 
Dedication as essentially the setting aside of real property 
for the use or ownership of others, citing Armand v. 
qpportunity Management Co, Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 714, 117 
P.3d 123, 128 (2005). 
Armand, supra, involved a Plat of 17 lots, including 
Lot 10 that was "Lake Frontage", and was three times the 
size of all the other lots. The platting owner, Smith, sold 
several vacant lots, prior to finalizing the Plat, to the 
Schafhausen Trust and the Warranty Deed specifically 
provided that the Grantor agrees that the Lake Frontage 
contained in Lot 10 of the proposed subdivision may be used 
by the Grantee, and by all other owners of lots in the 
proposed subdivision for access to the lake. Smith also 
presented an affidavit that he offered to dedicate Lot 10, 
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as part of his sale plans, by telling the purchasers that 
Lot 10 would be a common lot providing lake access, boat 
docks, and a swimming and picnic area. Further, that he 
intended Lot 10 as a corridor [between lot 9 and 11] for the 
owners to access the Lake. The lot purchaser also presented 
an affidavit that he purchased from Smith relying on Lot 10 
being a common area for recreational use and for lake 
access. 
On Appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment saying there were genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether a common law 
dedication occurred. 
Respondent's Brief, page 16, refers to the Trial 
Court's citation to Saddlehorn Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. 
Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 677 (2008), which involved two 
parcels being defined in the Plat as reserved for future 
recreation use. The Plat referred to these parcels as "R" 
lots defined in the legend as "Reserved" , Lot R-1 being 
labeled on the Plat as "Gravel Pit and Future Recreation 
Lot" and Lot R-4 labeled as "Recreation Center". Also, the 
Covenants defined common areas as any area designated on any 
current plat as common areas. Saddlehorn, supra, at 752 
held that when the landowner sells by reference to a 
recorded plat, ,,*** a dedication of public areas indicated 
~ the plat is accomplished." (citing Monaco v. Bennion, 99 
Idaho 529, 533 (1978) and Smy~ie v. Pearsa~~, 93 Idaho 188, 
191 (1969). 
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The key words are that the dedication of the public 
areas must be indicated by the Plat, clear and unequivocal, 
of the owner's intent to dedicate the land. In the instant 
action, there is no indication or dedication on the 
Steamboat Bay Plat indicating a clear and unequivocal 
dedication. The Plat, Owner's Certification, is clear and 
unequivocal, i.e. Lot 1 extends to Priest Lake, there is no 
common beach indicated, designated, or platted. 
Respondents' Brief, first paragraph 22, for the last of 
many such claims unsupported, and in fact and law precisely 
contrary to District Judge Verby's ruling, states, 
"The Trial Court correctly stated the law 
of Idaho thereby finding that Harkers 
reserved title to themselves in the common 
beach area and dedicated the common beach 
area to the use of all eight (8) lots." 
The foregoing is contrary to the District Judge Verby's 
finding that Plaintiff did not receive anything, by that he 
meant they received nothing, from the Harker/Wright deed 
reservation language. 
VI . DORSEY'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Concerning Dorsey's request for attorney fees, 
Respondents are in error that DORSEY does not appear to 
argue statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-203, and a 
statute of frauds argument, Idaho Code § 9-503, and that 
neither were asserted at the trial level. 
ROSS, et al., makes the above entitled assertions in 
the third beginning paragraph, page 23, of the Respondents' 
Brief. These assertions are contrary to the record. 
-16-
For Defendants' DORSEY - Trial Memorandum, R. Vol. 1, 
pp. 174-175, cites and argues Idaho Code, statutes of 
limitations §5-207, §5-20B, and §5-210. Further, DORSEY'S 
counsel argued these statutes and theories in closing 
argument. Idaho Code §9-503 was argued in closing arguments 
at Court Trial, p. 291, and the statute of limitations Idaho 
Code §5-203 is specifically argued at Court Trial, p. 297. 
In summary, Respondents' Brief claim that Idaho Code 
§5-203 and Idaho Code §9-503 were "neither ... asserted at the 
trial level" is contrary to the trial record itself. 
CONCLUSION 
DORSEY by this brief in reply to the brief of the 
Respondents concludes and requests relief, as follows: 
1. ROSS, et aI, brought this action for quiet title, 
and they must prevail if at all on the strength of their own 
title, not the weakness of DORSEY'S title. They have failed 
on their own burden of proof. Judgment should be entered 
Dismissing their Amended Complaint For Judgment of Quiet 
Title. 
2. The Steamboat Bay Plat clearly and unequivocally, 
in Harker's Owner's Certification, states the platting 
owners' intention that Lot 1 included all land to the waters 
of Priest Lake. 
3. Bailey, Plaintiffs' own expert witness surveyor, 
agreed that Lot 1 was created by the plat such that Lot 1 
land extend to the waters of Priest Lake. There was no land 
lying between Lot 1 and Priest Lake; therefore, Harkers 
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"reserved" no land existing at all. 
4. For argument purposes accepting Judge Verby's 
finding the Plat was ambiguous as a matter of law, an 
ambiguous Plat can not be a clear and unequivocal, common 
law dedication. The finding of a common law dedication of 
an easement, was unpled, untried, unargued, and a surprise 
appearing for the first time after closing argument in 
District Judge Verby's ruling, which should be reversed as 
not within the scope of the pleadings or the evidence, or 
the trial, or arguments of any counsel. 
5. The so called private easement to ROSS, et aI, is 
not based on Idaho law. 
6. ROSS, et al., were barred by Idaho Code §5-203 and 
5-205. Idaho Code §5-207 provides that Wright and then 
Dorsey are deemed to have held the property adversely, and a 
decree of quiet title should be entered in favor of Dorsey. 
7. Harker, by the time of this action and the trial, 
owned no lots in Steamboat Bay Plat. Their reservation in 
themselves of a common beach for themselves as lot owners 
subsequently failed. 
8. Dorsey is entitled to attorney fees and costs, 
pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121, as requested pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1) and I.A.R. 41. 
, T# 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ 7 ~ay of November, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. nt~\.. 
I hereby certify that on this ~g day of November, 
2012, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were 
served by deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were 
addressed to: 
Edward J. Anson 
Witherspoon Kelley 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(Attorney for Banner Bank) 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, CHTD. 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents) 
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